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Abstract Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor anti-
symmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input
to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of “indifference”
in individual preferences is misleading and should be replaced by equivalence and
undecidedness.
In this context, ten types of majority and minority arguments of different
strength are studied which lead to social choice rules C : (S;R) 7→ C(S;R) ∈
P(S) \ {∅} that accept profiles R of arbitrary reflexive relations. These rules are
discussed by means of many familiar, and some new conditions, including im-
munity from binary arguments. Moreover, it is proved that every choice function
satisfying two weak Condorcet-type conditions can be made both composition-
consistent and idempotent, and that all the proposed rules have polynomial time
complexity.
Key words algorithm, majority, quasi-order, time complexity, tournament.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we shall reconsider the question of how a group of individuals should
proceed to make their decision if they want to realize exactly one out of a certain
set X of alternatives. We shall do this under the usual assumptions that (i) all
information relevant for the choice is which individuals prefer which alternatives
to which other alternatives, and that (ii) the result of the procedure should not only
be some alternative(s) that are “best” in X , but rather some “best” alternative(s)
for each non-empty subset S of X . For the sake of simplicity, we will not consider
“degrees” of preference here, although there are some good arguments that, for
I would like to thank the editors for calling my attention to articles [?] and [?].
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example, fuzzy relations are a more precise model of actual individual preferences.
Still, the ideas presented here can probably be translated into a fuzzy preference
setting, particularly, the classes of generalized majority/minority relations we will
study below may perhaps be interpreted as fuzzy social preferences. But although
the introduced axioms of immunity from binary arguments can be interpreted as
axioms for one individual with fuzzy preferences (as in [?], for example) rather
than a society with exact preferences, they are not intended for and hardly make
sense in the fuzzy case.
If we understand (i) in a way that denies either the existence of “degrees” of
individual preference, or their measurability, or at least their relevance, we can
assume that the individual preferences are given as binary relations on X , and
since their significance lies in the comparison of different alternatives, we may
adopt the convention to use reflexive relations only. We will see, however, that
it is neither justified nor (for most purposes) necessary to assume that individual
preference relations have any special properties other than reflexivity.
As usual, we deal with a finite set N of individuals, and without loss of gener-
ality letN = {1, . . . , n} and n > 1. I will use i, j, . . . as variables over individuals.
The possible alternatives build a set X , and it is important that X is finite, too, but
this is not an actual restriction since, in all practical situations, there will always be
only finitely many feasible alternatives. We may as well assume that |X | = m > 2.
Alternatives will be denoted by variables x, y, . . ..
The motivation for (ii) is this: Because X is meant to contain also those al-
ternatives that might turn out to be actually impossible after the decision is made,
and because, on the other hand, there are situations in which two or more alter-
natives appear in the individual preferences in completely equivalent ways, we
shall consider social choice rules C, i.e. algorithms that provide the group with
a (multivalued) choice function rather than a single alternative. This is a function
C : P(X)\{∅} → P(X)\{∅} that assigns to each nonempty S ⊆ X a (hopefully
small) subset C(S) ⊆ S of alternatives that I will call acceptable here. Then, as
soon as the set S of feasible alternatives is known to the group, they can choose
some x ∈ C(S) either randomly, or by delegating that decision to some individ-
ual, or in whatever alternative way. In fact, some authors discuss algorithms that
directly assign a probability distribution to S rather than a subset. But even in such
a model, which is more general than the present one, a discussion of choice rules
remains important, since it is rather natural to define an induced choice rule by
letting C(S) be the set of alternatives receiving a nonzero probability.
In order to have a fixed interpretation of the input to the algorithm C, let us
assume that, for each pair (x, y) ∈ X ×X each individual i ∈ N has been
asked whether or not she thinks that
alternative x is at least as desirable to her as alternative y.
The input to the algorithm is then the resulting profile (of individual preferences)
on X , i.e. the tuple R = (R1, . . . , Rn) of reflexive binary relations on X , where
xRi y holds if and only if i has answered “yes” to the above question. To make
clear from which profile R the output choice function is derived, the set C(S) will
in some places more accurately be denoted by C(S;R).
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An isomorphism between profiles R on X and R′ on X ′ is here a bijection
ϕ : X → X ′ between the two sets of alternatives for which there is another
bijection ψ : N → N ′ between the two sets of individuals such that xRi y ⇐⇒
ϕ(x)R′ψ(i) ϕ(y) for all x, y ∈ X and i ∈ N . In this case, R and R′ will be called
isomorphic. For example, the identity map idX is an isomorphism between R =
(R1, . . . , Rn) and Rψ := (Rψ(1), . . . , Rψ(n)) for every permutation ψ : N → N
of individuals. Throughout this paper I will adopt a very broad idea of equality and
independence: We will only consider rules that are anonymous w.r.t. individuals
and neutral w.r.t. alternatives, which can be summarized in the following condition
of isomorphism invariance:
(Iso) C(ϕ[S];R′) = ϕ[C(S;R)]
whenever ϕ is an isomorphism between R and R′.
We may then think of R and Rψ as being essentially the same profile. Moreover,
our rules will be independent of irrelevant alternatives, i.e. fulfill
(I) C(S;R) = C(S;R|S),
where R|S = (R1|S , . . . , Rn|S) and Ri|S = Ri ∩ (S × S) are the restrictions
of R and Ri to S, respectively. The condition expresses the idea that, for a choice
of feasible alternatives, only (preferences about) feasible alternatives should be
relevant. This has the nice consequence that C is already determined as soon as
C(X ;R) is known for all X and all profiles R on X .
2 At least all quasi-orders must be admissible individual preferences
To begin with, a given profileR provides us with the following additional relations:
Pi := Ri \R
op
i is the asymmetric part of Ri, where R
op
i = {(x, y) : (y, x) ∈ Ri},
and asymmetric means that xPi y excludes y Pi x. Pi contains the expressed strict
preferences of i. The rest of Ri is its symmetric part Ei := Ri ∩ Ropi , the ex-
pressed equivalences of i. Although, in case of complete preferences, this rela-
tion is usually called “indifference” and is then consequently denoted by the let-
ter I , in case of incomplete preferences the above terminology is better for two
reasons: It resembles standard order-theoretical terminology (cf. [?]), and, what
is especially important in this context, Ei must not be confused with the rela-
tion xUi y :⇐⇒ ¬(xRi y ∨ y Ri x) which, according to the interpretation we
started with, encodes the expressed undecidedness of i whether to prefer x, or y,
or whether to value them as equally desirable.
Being undecided does not automatically imply being also unconcerned, be-
cause it may simply be the case that a person measures the alternatives with more
than just one criterion and that x is better with respect to one aspect but y with
respect to another. My point is that, in fact, in the fewest situations each individ-
ual uses only one criterion to evaluate alternatives. Let us therefore consider the
situation of an individual i with a set Ci of different criteria so that each criterion
c ∈ Ci provides him with a different preference relation Ric. There is no legitima-
tion (and no necessity) to forbid him to consider x at least as desirable as y if and
only if x is at least as good as y with respect to all his criteria. More precisely: It
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well makes sense and should therefore surely be legitimate for i to represent his
preferences by the relation Ri :=
⋂
c∈Ci
Ric. It should also be his right to use as
many and as independent criteria as he likes. But then the resulting Ri might be
any partial order (i.e. reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, but not necessarily com-
plete), even if all used criteria lead to linearly ordered (i.e. complete,1 transitive,
and antisymmetric) preferences Ric. This follows from a basic order-theoretical
fact (cf. [?]):
Lemma 1 Any partial order on a finite set X is an intersection of at most |X |
many linear orders on X , any quasi-order on X an intersection of at most |X |
many total quasi-orders of the form (X ×X) \ ((X \ S)× S) for some S ⊆ X .
In the latter kind of total quasi-orders there are two subsets S, X \S of equally de-
sirable alternatives such that those from S are preferred to the rest. They naturally
arise from binary criteria, therefore Lemma 1 implies that even if only binary crite-
ria are used,Ri might still be even any quasi-order (i.e. reflexive and transitive, but
not necessarily complete or antisymmetric). The immediate and in my eyes indis-
putable consequence of this is that, contrary to the completeness assumption that
occurs throughout the literature, every quasi-order on X must be an admissible
individual preference relation.
A quite different argument against the completeness assumption comes from
the fact that i might have different intentions when expressing xEi y rather than
xUi y: On the one hand, saying “x and y are equally desirable to me” can be
interpreted as a vote not to distinguish between x and y, i.e., a vote for having
either both or none of them in C(S). On the other hand, xUi y may be interpreted
as the statement “I do not want to decide about x and y” in the sense that i wants to
delegate the decision about x and y to those individuals that have more information
about, or more interest in the distinction between x and y. Such a delegation is an
often sensible and, in practice, very common behaviour, especially when (i) there
are many alternatives, or (ii) some pairs of alternatives differ only in their effect
on few individuals, or (iii) some individuals have restricted information.
Before we turn to the concept of majority and minority, let us finally remember
that it has also been noticed that, in some cases, individual preferences may con-
tain cycles. But, despite the fact that we have to be a bit careful with Pareto-type
principles then (see below), there seems to be no problem at all in dealing with
cyclic preferences, too, at least not when the preference information that is taken
into account by the rule C in any case only consists of some cardinalities like the
following:
rxy := |{i ∈ N : xRi y}|,
pxy := |{i ∈ N : xPi y}|,
exy := |{i ∈ N : xEi y}| = eyx = rxy − pxy,
uxy := |{i ∈ N : xUi y}| = uyx = n− dxy,
1 A note on terminology: in order theory, complete relations are usually called “total”
instead, while a “complete” quasi-order is one in which infima and suprema exist.
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dxy := |{i ∈ N : xRi y ∨ y Ri x}| = dyx = pxy + pyx + exy, and
dS := |{i ∈ N : xPi y for some x, y ∈ S}|.
In some places below, I will identify irreflexive relations with their reflexive coun-
terparts and use a somewhat sloppy arrow notation; for example, A = a ⇄ c →
b← a, d→ b should be read as
A = {(a, a), (b, b), (c, c), (d, d), (a, c), (c, a), (c, b), (a, b), (d, b)}.
Only in case of quasi-orders, the more convenient Hasse diagrams can, and will be
used; the above example would therefore rather look like this:
A =
ac d
 upslope
b
.
Analogously to the order-theoretic notions of “minimal” and “smallest” elements,
let us call an alternative x A-optimal if, for all y, y Ax implies xAy. As there
are not always optimal elements of A|S , we will often use its transitive hull
trS(A) =
⋃∞
k=0(A|S)
k
, that is, the smallest quasi-order on S containing A|S . If
A is a tournament, that is, complete and antisymmetric, the set of trS(A)-optimal
elements is just the top-cycle of A|S .
3 Binary arguments supported by majorities
Despite some irritating phenomena that are related to the concept of “majority”,
this notion is surely the most important idea in the theory of social choice. It is well
known that we can’t expect any alternative to have majority support, but whatever
exact definition of majority we may adopt, an alternative x should only be accept-
able to the group if it is at least in some sense “defendable” against arguments a
majority of the group might give against x. The most important type of such ar-
guments seems to be what may be called “binary” arguments: A part of the group
might argue that another alternative y is more desirable to them than x and that
therefore x should not be acceptable. Since, for every alternative there might be a
majority that favours a different alternative, we should think about possibilities to
counter and refuse some of these binary arguments so as to make a choice possi-
ble. Assume that we have in some way decided which kinds of binary arguments to
consider important, and let y Ax denote the fact that the given profile R contains
such an argument for y against x. Now consider the following possible conditions
on C:
(wImA) If x ∈ C(S), y ∈ S \ {x}, and y Ax,
there must be z ∈ S \ {y} with z A y.
(ImA) If x ∈ C(S), y ∈ S, and y Ax, then x trS(A) y
(i.e. there must be z1, . . . , zm ∈ S with xAz1A · · ·AzmAy).
(sImA) Each x ∈ C(S) must be optimal in trS(A)
(i.e. if x ∈ C(S), y ∈ S, and y trS(A)x, then also x trS(A) y).
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The condition (wImA) of weak A-immunity claims that when y is used in an argu-
ment against x, x can only be acceptable if the proposed “better” alternative y is
subject to a similar argument.
Perhaps one should at least require the stronger property of A-immunity (ImA)
which claims that the argument y Ax must even be answered with a sequence
of similar arguments that lead back to x. This is because the existence of such a
sequence effectively demonstrates that the argument y Ax is destructive in two re-
spects: (i) It cannot “consistently” be taken into account without the risk of making
all alternatives inacceptable (rather than just x): if the argument y Ax is success-
ful, then so should be all others in the sequence, which would result in excluding
x, y, z1, . . . , zm at once. (ii) The argument is also somehow useless for its support-
ers, because it does not place y in an essentially better position than x.
The appeal of the even more restrictive strong A-immunity (sImA) is that it
treats the situation more symmetrically: Even if there is only a sequence of ar-
guments leading from y to x instead of a direct one, there shall also be such a
sequence leading back.
Let us look at some possible concretizations of the notion of majority, that is,
some possible definitions of A as a function of R. The following binary relations
on X encode (proper) majorities of different types and strengths α in terms of the
individual preferences: For all S ⊆ X , x, y ∈ S, and 12 < α 6 1, let
xMα y :⇐⇒ pxy > αn, (=⇒ pxy > 0)
xNα y :⇐⇒ rxy > αn, (=⇒ rxy > 0)
xMSα y :⇐⇒ pxy > αdS > 0,
xNSα y :⇐⇒ rxy > αdS > 0,
xBα y :⇐⇒ pxy > αdxy > 0,
xDα y :⇐⇒ rxy > αdxy > 0,
x Pα y :⇐⇒ pxy > α(pxy + pyx) > 0,
xRα y :⇐⇒ rxy > α(rxy + ryx), pxy > 0
xUα y :⇐⇒ pxy > pyx, pxy + uxy > αn
(⇐⇒ rxy > ryx, ryx 6 (1− α)n), and
xEα y :⇐⇒ pxy > pyx, pxy + exy > αdxy
(⇐⇒ rxy > ryx, rxy > αdxy).
(For α = 1, Pα, Rα, Uα and Eα should, of course, not be confused with the
preferences of individual 1.)
Most of these definitions have in common that the individuals constituting the
majority share some opinion about x and y and build a fraction of at least α of all
in some way relevant individuals. Moreover, there must at least be one individual
within a majority. That unifying opinion can be either strictly preferring x to y
(which corresponds to using the number pxy in Mα, Bα, and Pα, for example),
or just considering x at least as desirable as y (which corresponds to using rxy in
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Nα,Dα, andRα). The relevant individuals are either all (where n is used), or those
that are not undecided about x and y (which corresponds to using dxy), or only
those that express a strict preference about x and y (as in Pα). Although rxy + ryx
does not, in general, enumerate some subset of individuals,Rα has the appeal that,
similarly to Pα, it considers those majority arguments “equally strong” in which
the proportion rxy/ryx is constant. This is because xRα y is mainly equivalent to
rxy/ryx >
α
1−α (the condition pxy 6= 0 is added only to ensure antisymmetry and
the inclusions that are stated below). In some of the definitions, dS occurs instead
of n, which models kinds of “semi-relative” majorities. This could provide a com-
promise between using absolute majorities and the possible requirement thatC(S)
should be at least independent of individuals that are completely undecided about
all feasible alternatives. On the other hand, it might be problematic if whether or
not individual i is counted would depend on perhaps just one alternative’s being
feasible or not.
The last two definitions deserve a more detailed explanation: They express the
idea that in the first place only individuals with strict preferences for x over y will
raise the corresponding argument against y, but that then additional individuals
may join them to build a majority. For example, if only slightly more people strictly
prefer x to y than y to x, the former might persuade all who equally desire x and y
to support their argument, so that in the end a very strong majority evolves (relative
to all decided individuals); this is assumed in the definition of Eα. One could also
assume that, on the contrary, the undecided individuals are persuaded to constitute
an (absolute) majority, which leads to Uα.
Since α > 12 , it can easily be seen that, despite Nα, N
S
α , and Dα, all of the
above relations are antisymmetric. Moreover, we have some, perhaps unexpected,
inclusions that are shown in the lower part of the diagram on page 10: (i) When α
grows, the relations obviously shrink (which is represented by the dotted lines).
(ii) Mα ⊆MSα ⊆ Bα ⊆ Rα ⊆ Pα ⊆ Eα ⊆ Dα,
because n > dS > dxy , rxy = pxy + exy, and
αdxy + exy > α(rxy + ryx) > α(pxy + pyx) + exy > αdxy .
Similarly, Mα ⊆ Nα ⊆ NSα ⊆ Dα, MSα ⊆ NSα , and Bα ⊆ Uα. (iii) For
α 6 n2n−1 , xRα y is equivalent to pxy 6= 0 and rxy/ryx >
n
n−1 , the latter be-
ing equivalent to rxy > ryx. Then xRα y is already implied by xEα y, so that
Rα = Pα = Uα. (iv) xUα y implies ¬ y N1−α+1/n x.
Summarizing this section, we have the following classes of majority relations:
Mα and Nα encode absolute majorities, MSα and NSα semi-relative majorities,
Bα and Dα relative ones, Pα and Rα proportional ones, and Eα and Uα encode
persuaded majorities. Moreover, M , MS , B, P , E and U will be called the strict
types, and the rest non-strict.
8 Jobst Heitzig
4 Rules based on immunity from classes of binary arguments
For a fixed profile R, each of the sets {trS(Aα) : 12 < α 6 1}, where A is one of
the ten types M , N , MS , . . . , is a chain of quasi-orders. Now it is important that
X is finite: Then the chain is also finite, and the following Lemma applies:
Lemma 2 Every chain2 Q1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Qm of finite quasi-orders has a common
optimal element, i.e. some x that is Qk-optimal for all k 6 m.
Proof. Since Qm is finite, the set Sm of its optimal elements is not empty. Let
Sm−1 ⊆ Sm be the (also non-empty) set of optimal elements of Qm−1|Sm . Then
each x ∈ Sm−1 is also Qm−1-optimal, because
y Qm−1 x =⇒ y Qm x =⇒ y ∈ Sm =⇒ xQm−1 y.
Thus, denoting the set of optimal elements of Qk|Sk+1 by Sk, we inductively get
S1, the still not empty set of all common optimal elements. 
Note that, consequently, the set of common optimal elements can be found
in polynomial time. The above observation enables us to fulfill (sImA) not only
for one specific majority relation, say M1/2+ε, but at once for a whole class
of majority relations of the same type but of different strength: We may simply
define C(S) as the set of common optimal elements of, for example, the chain
{trS(Mα) :
1
2 < α 6 1}. Then any x ∈ C(S) can be defended against a sequence
of arguments yMα z1Mα · · ·MαzmMα x with a sequence of equally strong M -
type arguments. ExchangingM by any of the other types of majority relations and
varying the lower and upper bounds for α, we get a large number of majority-based
rules with very good immunity properties. Let us introduce the following notation:
For 12 6 β < γ 6 1, the rule based on the chain {trS(Aα) : β < α 6 γ}, where
A is one of M , N , MS , . . . , will be denoted by A(β,γ]. For example, we just
introduced the rule M(.5,1].
It seems quite natural to me to take minorities in the same way into account as
majorities: Suppose we apply the definitions of Mα, . . . , Uα even for 0 < α 6 12 ,
except that we drop all of the “ > 0”-requirements here. Then Dα, Pα, and Rα
become complete relations for α 6 12 (but only Uα and Eα remain antisymmetric
in general), and in the inclusions, Rα and Pα change places: Still Mα ⊆ Nα ⊆
NSα ⊆ Dα, but now
Mα ⊆M
S
α ⊆ Bα ⊆ Pα ⊆ Rα ⊆ Dα
and Uα ⊆ Eα = Rn/(2n−1). Moreover,R1/2 = P1/2, and no longer Bα ⊆ Uα.
Now, requiring (ImAα) as well for 0 < α 6 12 would ensure that also a mi-
nority argument y Aα x will be successful if only if it can be taken into account
“consistently”. In such a case it is not only harmless to give the minority this “di-
rect” power to exclude y, but it may even be indicated in certain situations: (i)
2 Chains (towers/nested families) of other kinds of relations are also an important tool in
modelling uncertain or stochastically varying preferences of one individual, cf. [?,?]
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When an absolute or semi-relative majority type is used and many individuals are
undecided (because of too few information, for example), or (ii) when a strict type
other than P is used and many individuals equally desire x and y (because they
are not affected by their distinction, for example), minority arguments should be
taken into account.
Moreover, if we even require (sImAα) for 0 < α 6 12 , a minority argument
y Aα x which is refused as a single argument, may still have “indirect” power:
Other such arguments can help constituting a sequence of arguments leading to
the exclusion of x, if at least one of them is non-refusable. While indirect influ-
ence works with all of the types, direct influence of a minority is only possible if A
is none of the complete types D, P , or R: If, for example, y Dα x for some α 6 12
but for no α′ > 12 , then ryx 6
1
2dyx, thus rxy >
1
2dxy > αdxy , hence also xDα y.
However, in the crucial situations (i) and (ii) described above, a subgroup of indi-
viduals that would be a minority of one of the other types might well constitute a
majority of type D, P , or R.
The rules A(β,γ] with 0 6 β 6 γ 6 12 will be called minority-based rules,
those with 0 6 β 6 12 < γ 6 1 mixed rules.
As for the question which of the possible types of majority/minority to use, it may
turn out that this cannot be completely decided in the usual axiomatic way. Thus, in
addition to the short axiomatic discussion in the next section, the rules should also
be compared from a more practical perspective. Surely, some types like M , N , B,
P , and D look more “simple” or “natural” than others, and E and U are based
on questionable behavioural imputations. There is a good reason to prefer some of
the “larger” types: Whatever type A we use, an x ∈ C(S) may become subject to
an argument supported by a majority of a different type, say y A′α x. It may then
still possible to refuse y Aα x on the basis of a sequence of Aα-arguments leading
back to y, if only A′α ⊆ Aα, i.e., the rule using A is in some sense also immune
from arguments corresponding to types smaller than A.
Following an argument from Section 2, another criterion is that xEi y and
xUi y should not always have the same effect, which is a point against using M
and P .
In all, the non-persuaded, relative types D (being the largest such) and B (be-
ing the largest that allows “direct” influence of minorities) seem to give the best
compromises so far. As for the range of α, its lower bound β should be taken as
small as possible in order to keep the resulting set C(S) as small as possible. On
the other hand, taking the upper bound γ not to large could be a sort of protec-
tion of minorities, since then it would be possible to counter arguments of strength
> γ by a sequence of arguments of strength γ. However, even in such a case one
would probably add trs(A1) to the chain, the corresponding rules will be denoted
by A(β,γ],1 Depending on how much power and protection we want to give mi-
norities, one could for example use the rules D(.5,1], D(0,1], B(0,1], B(0,2/3],1, or
even B(0,.5],1.
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Fig. 1 Majority and minority relations
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5 Some conditions discussed
Pareto-principles. The idea that y is unacceptable if all individuals (strictly) prefer
x to it can only work when there is a minimal amount of rationality in at least one
individual’s preferences. Thus, in a setting where cyclic individual preferences are
explicitly admitted, adequate formulations of this idea must take possible cycles
into account:
Social Choice Under Incomplete, Cyclic Preferences 11
(wP) y /∈ C(S) whenever xM1 y for some x ∈ S, but not y trS(M1)x.
(sP) y /∈ C(S) whenever xN1 y for some x ∈ S, but not y trS(N1)x.
(sP’) y /∈ C(S) whenever xB1 y for some x ∈ S, but not y trS(B1)x.
(NNP) x ∈ C(S) whenever x ∈ S and xN1 y for some y ∈ C(S).
The weak and strong Pareto-principles (wP) and (sP) are just the conditions
(ImM1) and (ImN1), while the alternative (sP’) is just (ImB1). SinceM is the small-
est majority type, adding the relation trS(M1) to a chain {trS(Aα)} gives again
a chain. This results in a class of (wP)-modified rules I will denote by A(β,γ]M1.
The case of (sP) is different: trS(N1) cannot always be added, but:
Lemma 3 Suppose y is trS(Aα)-optimal, and xN1 y for some x ∈ S. Then x is
also trS(Aα)-optimal in each of the following cases:
(i) A ∈ {N,NS , D}.
(ii) A ∈ {M,MS, P}, and RiPiRi ⊆ Pi for all i ∈ N .
(iii) A ∈ {B,R,E}, and all Ri are transitive.
Proof. Immediate since (i) N1 ⊆ Nα ∩ NSα ∩ Dα, (ii) xN1 y and RiPiRi ⊆ Pi
for all i ∈ N imply pxz > pyz and pzy > pzx for all z ∈ X , and (iii) xN1 y and
RiRi ⊆ Ri for all i ∈ N imply rxz > ryz and rzy > rzx. 
Therefore, among the common trS(Aα)-optimal elements there is at least one
N1-optimal element as long as (i), (ii), or (iii) holds. Particularly, we get the (sP)-
modified rules N(β,γ],1, NS(β,γ]N1, andD(β,γ]N1 by adding trS(N1) to the defining
chain. For other types A, the analogously defined algorithms A(β,γ]N1 only pro-
duce a nonempty set C(S) if all individual preferences show at least some minimal
amount of “rationality” in form of some transitivity property. On the other hand, in
my opinion, (sP) is not always reasonable anyway: It misinterprets equivalence as
undecidedness and ignores that xEi y often expresses i’s intention that either both
or none of x and y be accepted. This is of particular importance if the alternatives
at hand affect individuals that do not belong to the deciding group, as for example
when an award must be given to a single candidate: Suppose that, except one, all
members i of a not too small jury have xEi y. Then it seems wise to rather select
one of the candidates x, y randomly than excluding one of them only on the basis
of a single juror’s preferences.
Analogously, the second strong form (sP’) of the Pareto-principle can be ful-
filled by using an (sP’)-modified rule A(β,γ]B1 with A ∈ {B,U,R, P,E,D}.
Again by the previous lemma, A(β,γ] fulfills the last condition (NNP), non-
negative Pareto, for all profiles if A ∈ {N,NS, D}, but only for “rational” pro-
files if A ∈ {M,MS, P,B,R,E}. Finally, for profiles of quasi-ordered prefer-
ences, one may satisfy all four conditions using an algorithm A(β,γ]B1M1N1 with
A ∈ {B,R, P,E,D}.
Responsiveness.
(sNNR) If x ∈ C(S;R) 6∋ z, y ∈ X , i ∈ N , R′i \ {x, y}2 = Ri \ {x, y}2,
and either xEi y and xP ′i y, or y Pi x and y E′i x,
then x ∈ C(S;R1, . . . , Ri−1, R′i, Ri+1, . . . , Rn) 6∋ z.
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(PR) If x, y ∈ C(S;R), i ∈ N , R′i \ {x, y}2 = Ri \ {x, y}2,
and either xEi y and xP ′i y, or y Pi x and y E′i x,
then y /∈ C(S;R1, . . . , Ri−1, R′i, Ri+1, . . . , Rn).
Assume x ∈ C(S;R), and now only one individual i replaces either (i) a strict
preference y Pi x by an equivalence y E′i x, or (ii) an equivalence xEi y by a strict
preference xP ′i y, while all other individual preferences remain the same, giving a
profile (R1, . . . , Ri−1, R′i, Ri+1, . . . , Rn). Then the change should neither make
x unacceptable, nor make any former unacceptable alternative z acceptable. This
strong version (sNNR) of the well known condition of non-negative responsive-
ness is easily seen to hold for all of our majority/minority-based rules so far:
Proof. The relevant cardinalities change only for x and y, and at most by
one: either (i) rxy and exy increase and pyx decreases, or (ii) pxy increases,
and exy and ryx decrease. Also, dS remains unchanged. Consequently, each of
our majority/minority relations Aα is changed to some A′α that differs only in
that possibly the arrow x → y is added and/or the arrow y → x is removed.
Therefore x remains trS(Aα)-optimal. Now let Aα be one of those relations for
which z is not trS(Aα)-optimal, say w trS(Aα) z but not z trS(Aα)w, and as-
sume that z becomes trS(A′α)-optimal. (i) If still w trS(A′α) z, the now also ex-
isting path z A′α · · ·A′α w must contain the only possible new arrow x → y,
i.e. z A′α · · ·A′α xA′α y A′α · · ·A′α w. But then z trS(Aα)x, hence w trS(Aα)x,
and thus x trS(Aα)w, since x is trS(Aα)-optimal. This gives the contradic-
tion z trS(Aα)w. (ii) If, on the other hand, no longer w trS(A′α) z, the corre-
sponding Aα-path must have contained the now removed arrow y → x, i.e.
wAα · · ·Aα y Aα xAα · · ·Aα z, thus also x trS(A′α) z. But then z trS(A′α)x,
since z is trS(A′α)-optimal, hence also z trS(Aα)x. Together with x trS(Aα)w
(by optimality of x), we get again the contradiction z trS(Aα)w. 
The related condition of positive responsiveness (PR) expresses the idea that,
if a “non-deterministic” choice C(S) with |C(S)| > 2 is interpreted as a kind of
“social undecidedness”, it should be possible to turn it into a “deterministic” choice
with |C(S)| = 1 by only slight changes in the individual preferences. However,
the same objection that was given against (sP) is also a point against (PR), and
none of our rules satisfies it, since for the three profiles

d c b
| | |
a b a
| , | , |
c d d
| | |
b a c


,


d c
| |
a b ab
| , | , |
c d d
| | |
b a c


, and


d c a
| | |
a b b
| , | , |
c d d
| | |
b a c


,
each of the majority relations has always the same set of optimals.
Condorcet-type conditions. It seems reasonable that if an alternative is strictly
preferred to each other alternative by a (possibly varying) majority, it should be the
one and only choice. Also, if x is acceptable compared to every single alternative
y ∈ S, one might want it to be acceptable in all of S, too (cf. [?]):
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(C) C(S) = {x} whenever C({x, y}) = {x} for all y ∈ S.
(GC) x ∈ C(S) whenever x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S.
Until now, these are only fulfilled by some of our majority/minority-based rules.
When only antisymmetric or only complete relations are used, (C) holds: Suppose
we use the common optimal elements of a chain trS(F1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ trS(Fm) of
quasi-orders, and (i) either all of the relations Fk are antisymmetric or (ii) all of
them are complete. Then ∀ y 6= x ∃ k : xFk y |Fk x implies ∀ y 6= x : xFm y |F1 x,
so that no y 6= x is trS(Fm)-optimal in case of (i) resp. trS(F1)-optimal in case
of (ii). The variant (GC) is even fulfilled when both antisymmetric and complete
(but no other) types are used: Suppose x is Fk|{x,y}-optimal for all y ∈ S. Then
y Fk x for no y ∈ S \ {x} if Fk is antisymmetric, and xFk y for all y ∈ S if it is
complete instead. In both cases x is trS(Fk)-optimal.
However, we can still also use rules based on types that are neither antisymmet-
ric nor complete, since any rule C can be modified so as to fulfill (C) and/or (GC):
Let C(C)(S) be (the uniquely determined) singleton {x} if C({x, y}) := {x}
for all y ∈ S, and C(C)(S) := C(S) otherwise. This cuts C down to its (C)-
modification C(C). Moreover,
C(GC)(S) := C(S) ∪ {x ∈ S : x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S}
yields a (GC)-modified rule C(GC) which gives larger sets than C in general.
Lemma 4 If C satisfies (wImA), (ImA), (P), (sP), or (sP’), then so do C(C) and
C(GC), respectively.
Proof. As for (C): Under the assumption, y Ax ∈ C({x, y}) implies xAy. As for
(GC): Analogously, y Ax ∈ C(C)(S) \C(S) implies x ∈ C({x, y}), hence again
xAy. 
Unfortunately, (sImA) is preserved by neither modification: (GC): For the pro-
file 

c a
| |
ac , b , b , c
| | | |
b ac a b

,
we get M.5 = MS.5 = B.5 = c→ b↔ a, so taking all trS(M.5)-optimals leads to
a ∈ C({a, b}) ∩ C({a, c}), but a is not optimal. (C): For

a a c
| | |
c , c , b , b , b , ac , ac
| | | | | | |
b b a ac ac b b

,
we get {Mα : 17 = β < α 6 γ =
4
7} = {c↔ b↔ a→ c, c→ b↔ a, c→ b←
a}, so M(β,γ] leads to C({a, b}) = C({a, c}) = {a}, hence C(C)(S) = {a}, but
a is not trS(M3/7)-optimal.
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Idempotency. It would be somewhat strange if the same rule, applied to its first
result, would “cut down” the choice set further instead of leaving it unchanged.
One would rather expect that
(Id) The choice function S 7→ C(S;R) is idempotent,
that is, C(C(S;R);R) = C(S;R).
Although, in the first place, of our rules only those based on complete rela-
tions satisfy (Id), any rule C has its (Id)-modification C(Id), which is defined
by C(Id)(S) :=
⋂∞
m=1 C
m(S) and obviously fulfills (I), (Iso), (wImA), (ImA),
(sImA), (wP), (sP), (sP’), (NNP), (C), and (GC), if only C does.
Ratio rules. In [?], Pattanaik and Sengupta consider the special class SPCF of
choice rules that are defined only on sets of two alternatives and for a certain kind
of fuzzy relation instead of a preference profile. With the convention 0/0 := 1, the
quotients
δ(x, y) :=
rxy
dxy
, π(x, y) :=
pxy
pxy + pyx
and ̺(x, y) := rxy
rxy + ryx
that correspond to Dα, Pα, and Rα, respectively, are examples of such connected
fuzzy relations, while the quotients that correspond to the other majority types are
not connected. It turns out that the rules B(0,γ], M(0,γ], and MS(0,γ] with γ >
1
2
give x ∈ C({x, y}) if and only if π(x, y) > π(y, x). In other words, the induced
SPCFs are both ratio and difference rules of type 1 in the sense of Pattanaik and
Sengupta. The same is true for the rules D(β,1], N(0,1], and NS(0,1] with β 6
1
2
when we take ̺(x, y) instead of π(x, y).
Moreover, x is tr{x,y}(Pα)-optimal if and only if π(x, y) > α1−απ(y, x) (for
α 6 12 ) resp. if π(y, x) 6 cπ(x, y) (for α > 12 and c = α1−α − ε > 1 with some
sufficiently small ε > 0). Therefore, also all rules P(β,γ] are ratio rules, and the
analogue holds for R(β,γ] when using ̺(x, y) instead.
Furthermore, it might be interesting that, for a profile of total quasi-orders,
the functions dP (x, y) := 1 − π(x, y) and dR(x, y) := 1 − ̺(x, y) are distance
functions (cf. [?]), that is, they fulfill the triangle inequality d(x, y) + d(y, z) >
d(x, z). In fact,
pxy
pxy + pyx
+
pyz
pyz + pzy
−
pxz
pxz + pzx
+ 1
=
pxy
pxy + pyx
+
pyz
pyz + pzy
+
pzx
pzx + pxz
=
pxy
n− exy
+
pyz
n− eyz
+
pzx
n− ezx
6
pxy + exy − exyz
n− exyz
+
pyz + eyz − exyz
n− exyz
+
pzx + ezx − exyz
n− exyz
6
(rxy + ryz + rzx)− 3exyz
n− exyz
6
(2(n− exyz) + 3exyz)− 3exyz
n− exyz
= 2
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and
rxy
rxy + ryx
+
ryz
ryz + rzy
−
rxz
rxz + rzx
+ 1
=
rxy
rxy + ryx
+
ryz
ryz + rzy
+
rzx
rzx + rxz
=
n− pyx
2n− (pyx + pxy)
+
n− pzy
2n− (pzy + pyz)
+
n− pxz
2n− (pxz + pzx)
6
n+ pxy − ℓxyz
2n− ℓxyz
+
n+ pyz − ℓxyz
2n− ℓxyz
+
n+ pzx − ℓxyz
2n− ℓxyz
6
3n+ (n+ ℓxyz)− 3ℓxyz
2n− ℓxyz
= 2,
where exyz and ℓxyz are the numbers of individuals i that have xEi y Ei z resp.
a linear order on x, y, z. In fuzzy preference theory, this property of π(x, y) and
̺(x, y) is also called T2-transitivity (cf. [?,?,?]). For profiles of 3-acyclic relations
(i.e., when xPi y Pi z Pi x for no i, x, y, z), obviously also dM (x, y) := 1 − pxyn
fulfills the triangle inequality.
Other conditions.
(CA) x ∈ C(S), if x ∈ C(S′), x ∈ S ⊆ S′, and C(S) ∩C(S′) 6= ∅.
(β) If x, y ∈ C(S), and S ⊆ S′, then x ∈ C(S′)⇐⇒ y ∈ C(S′).
(SUA) C(S) = C(S′) whenever S ⊆ S′ and C(S′) ⊆ C(S).
In [?], Sen gives the following intuition for a slightly stronger version of Cher-
noff’s condition (CA): “if x is a best alternative in a given set and belongs to a
certain subset of it, then x must also be best in that subset, e.g. a world champion
must also be champion in his country”. Although, with a suitable interpretation
of “best”, this intuition is absolutely correct in my opinion, it is not, however, ac-
curately expressed by (CA) or Sen’s stronger condition (α), since we cannot, in
general, expect the elements of C(S) to be “best” in a sense as strong as indicated
by the word “champion”. Consider the well-known minimal example for a cyclic
majority relation, 

a b c
| | |
b , c , a
| | |
c a b

,
where X := {a, b, c}. Here, C(X) should be X indisputably, and, at least to me,
it is almost equally obvious that C({a, b}) should be {a}. But (CA) would require
C({a, b}) = {a, b}, which is absolute nonsense. However, when x ∈ S ⊆ S′ is
a best alternative in S′ in the sense that x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S′, it should
indeed be in C(S) (and as well inC(S′), of course), but this requirement is already
expressed in condition (GC).
As a support for (β), Sen gives the intuition that, “if two alternatives are both
best in a certain subset, then one can be best for the whole set if and only if so is
the other”, which would be correct when “best” could is interpreted as “at least as
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good as any other”. But, as we have already seen, the reason for C(S) containing
more than one alternative may be that some alternatives are just not comparable:
Assume that X = {a, b, c, d} and all individuals have the same preferences
a c
| |
b d
.
Then (Iso), (I), and (P) require C(X) = {a, c} and C({a, d}) = {a, d}, which is
a perfect solution, but not in accordance with (β).
A similar example shows that (SUA) is not absolutely reasonable in presence
of undecidedness: Suppose both of two individuals have xUi y, which results in
C({x, y}) = {x, y}when (Iso) and (I) hold, and now a third alternative z becomes
feasible. If both are undecided about z except that one prefers x to z and the other
prefers z to y, x should become the only acceptable alternative, in contradiction
to (SUA). Suzumura [?] shows that (CA) and (SUA) are implied by many other
conditions which I consequently won’t discuss here.
6 Invariance under decomposition into generalized components
When the number of alternatives is large, an important technique in actual decision
processes is that the alternatives may be grouped together to form a smaller number
of clusters, since then one can first choose between these clusters and then inside
the chosen cluster(s). For example, if the alternatives are some thousand video
taped movies in a store, it is practically impossible, even for a single person, to
write down a preference relation by comparing each pair of movies separately.
Instead, the alternatives are usually compared in classes, i.e. the group may classify
them according to their genre, then choose some genre, and finally choose a single
movie belonging to that genre. There is no problem in doing so, at least as long
as all individuals consider a classification by genre also significant for their own
preferences. But, in the above example, some individuals might prefer a clustering
by age, length, or actors, so that they probably would not accept the suggested
procedure to first choose a genre.
I will not discuss the difficult question of how, in general, to produce a mean-
ingful clustering which all individuals will accept, but there is one situation I con-
sider important for an axiomatic discussion of choice functions: Suppose there is
a subset B ⊆ X of alternatives that “belong together” in the sense that, for each
individual i and each alternative x outside of B, i values all alternatives in B alike
when compared with x. Then it seems very likely that all individuals would agree
that B is a meaningful cluster and can therefore be treated like a single alternative
in the beginning. However, there might at the same time also exist other subsets
B′ for which the very same is true. Therefore, it would be good to know that, in
the end, the resulting choice did not depend on the use of classification B or any
other classification B′, but would have been the same without any classification at
all.
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To be able to make this argument more precise, let us extend the concept of a
“component” of a tournament (cf. [?]) to the case of general binary relations: A
(generalized) component of a reflexive relation R on X is a subset B ⊆ X with
|B| > 2 such that, for all x ∈ X \B, whenever xR y for some y ∈ B, xR y for all
y ∈ B, and whenever y Rx for some y ∈ B, y Rx for all y ∈ B. An equivalent
formulation of the latter is this: For all x ∈ X \B, B ∩ xR 6= ∅ implies B ⊆ xR,
and B ∩Rx 6= ∅ implies B ⊆ Rx, where I used the usual order-theoretic notation
xR = {y ∈ X : xR y} and Rx = {y ∈ X : y Rx}. If B is a common component
of R1, . . . , Rn, then we shall call it a component of R. The components of R resp.
R build a hull system, and if B,B′ are incomparable but intersecting components,
also B ∪B′ and B \B′ are components.3
To treatB like a single alternative corresponds to using a new set of alternatives
S/B := S \ B ∪ {B} and the quotient profile R/B := (R1/B, . . . , Rn/B) of
individual preferences
Ri/B := Ri|X\B ∪ {(B,B)}
∪
(
{B} × (BRi \B)
)
∪
(
(RiB \B)× {B}
)
,
where BRi = {y ∈ X : xRi y for some x ∈ B}
and RiB = {y ∈ X : y Ri x for some x ∈ B}.
In other words, for all x, y ∈ X/B, xRi/B y if and only if either (i) x 6= B,
y 6= B, and xRi y, or (ii) x = y = B, or (iii) x = B, y 6= B, and z Ri y for all
z ∈ B, or (iv) x 6= B, y = B, and xRi z for all z ∈ B. For example:
R =


a c
/ \ / \
b c bb′ d
| | , | |
b′ c′ c′ a
|
d


, B = {b, b′} =⇒ R/B =


a c
/ \ / \
B c B d
| , | |
c′ c′ a
|
d


.
The set {c, c′} is only a component of the first relation.
Now, our above consideration finally yields the following condition on C:
(CC) For each component B ⊆ S of R:
C(S;R) =


C(S/B;R/B) if B /∈ C(S/B;R/B)
C(S/B;R/B) \ {B}
∪ C(B;R) if B ∈ C(S/B;R/B).
3 One has to be a bit careful about the terminology here: In case of graphs or quasi-
ordered sets, the generalized components are usually called “(lexicographic) factors” or
“blocks” [?], respectively. In graph and order theory, on the other hand, (ordinal or cardinal)
“components” are special cases of generalized components, while a “block” of a graph is
yet another thing.
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This expresses the claim that, whatever componentB we use, the acceptable alter-
natives are (i) those outside of B that are acceptable when treating B like a single
alternative, and (ii) if B itself is then acceptable, too, also those alternatives inside
of B that would be acceptable when only the B-alternatives were considered.
In [?], Laffond et al. introduced (CC) for the more special case of tournaments,
but using partitions into components instead of a single component.
Let us define a partial order (“finer than”) between rules by setting C 6 C′
if C(S;R) ⊆ C′(S;R) for all S,R. It is easily checked that whenever (Ci)i is a
family of rules with (CC) such that C′(S;R) := ⋂i Ci(S;R) 6= ∅ for all R and
S 6= ∅, the rule C′ : (S;R) 7→ C′(S;R) also fulfills (CC). Therefore, any rule
C trivially possesses a finest rule C′ > C with (CC), called the (CC)-hull of C.
This C′ might give considerably larger choice sets than C, in many cases it will
even give constantly C′(S) = S (cf. [?]). Also, no simple algorithm to determine
C′(S) is known, and as there can be exponentially many components of S, it seems
very likely that there can be no such algorithm with polynomial time complexity.
Therefore, let us look at another way to make a rule fulfill (CC):
Theorem 5 Let C : (S,R) 7→ C(S;R) be a social choice rule that fulfills (Iso),
(I), (GC), and (C). Then C(CC)(S;R) :=

C(S;R) if no B ⊂ S is a component of R
C(CC)(S/B;R/B) if B ⊂ S is a component of R
and B /∈ C(CC)(S/B;R/B)
C(CC)(S/B;R/B) \ {B} if B ⊂ S is a component of R
∪ C(CC)(B;R) and B ∈ C(CC)(S/B;R/B),
where ⊂ denotes proper containment, recursively defines another rule C(CC) such
that:
1. C(CC)(S;R) = C(S;R) if no component of R is properly contained in S.
2. C(CC) fulfills (Iso), (I), (GC), (C), and (CC).
The somewhat lengthy proof is to be found in the appendix.
Corollary 6 When C(S;R) can be computed in polynomial time for all S and R
then so can C(CC)(S;R).
Proof. For A ⊆ S, |S| = k, and a profile R on S, the set
ϕ(A) := A ∪ S \
⋂
i∈N
(⋂
x∈A
xPi ∪
⋂
x∈A
xEi ∪
⋂
x∈A
Pix ∪
⋂
x∈A
xUi
)
can be computed inO(k2n) time. A straightforward proof shows that, for x, y ∈ S,
x 6= y, Bxy := ϕk({x, y}) is the smallest component of R that contains x and y;
it can thus be computed in O(k3n) time. If R has a proper component, one of
the
(
k
2
)
many components Bxy must be proper and minimal, hence a minimal
proper component B can be found in O(k5n) time. When taking always minimal
components in the recursion, C(CC)(S) can be determined by computing C(Sj)
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for at most k − 1 different sets Sj ⊆ S, because all of the occurring components
and the final quotient are isomorphic to subsets of S. Thus, the time complexity of
C
(CC) is at most O(k6n) times that of C. 
We have already seen that the requirements of the theorem are fulfilled by all
rules based on only antisymmetric or only complete majority/minority relations,
and also by the (C)- and (GC)-modified rules.
Lemma 7 If components of R are always components of A, the modification C 7→
C(CC) preserves (wImA), (ImA), and (sImA).
Proof. Assume that B ⊆ S is a component of R. Then B is also a component of
A. For (sImA), let x ∈ S \B, x ∈ C(S/B;R/B), and y trS(A)x. Then
(i) y /∈ B : y trS/B(A/B)x =⇒ x trS/B(A/B) y =⇒x trS(A) y,
(ii) y ∈ B : B trS/B(A/B)x =⇒ x trS/B(A/B)B=⇒x trS(A) y.
On the other hand, let B ∈ C(S/B;R/B), x ∈ C(B;R), and y trS(A)x. Then
(iii) y /∈ B : y trS/B(A/B)B =⇒ B trS/B(A/B) y=⇒x trS(A) y,
(iv) y ∈ B, y trB(A)x : x trB(A) y=⇒x trS(A) y,
and (v) otherwise y ∈ B and the A-path from y to x must leave B, i.e.
y trS(A) y
′Az trS(A)wAx
′ trS(A)x for some x′, y′ ∈ B and z, w ∈ S \ B,
which implies xAz trS(A)wAy and thus x trS(A) y.
For (wImA) and (ImA), the arguments are analogous, only that case (v) does
not occur. 
Lemma 8 If C fulfills (Iso) and (CC) then so does C(Id).
Proof. Exactly as in [?], where the special case of tournaments was considered. 
7 Conclusion
As we have seen, it is not a real problem to allow individual preferences to be
incomplete and even cyclic, i.e., any reflexive relation. In fact, Lemma 1 shows
that we should at least allow all quasi-orders. The requirements of immunity from
binary arguments, (ImA), for a large class of majority and/or minority relations A
of different strength directly lead to social choice rules which already fulfill some
of the most frequently discussed axioms. Using proper modifications, one may
fulfill additional axioms: Lemmata 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and Theorem 5 imply
Corollary 9 Let F be a chain of majority relations with M1 ∈ F , and C be the
rule for which C(S) is the set of common optimals of {trS(A) : A ∈ F}. Then
the rule C(C)(GC)(CC)(Id) fulfills the axioms (Iso), (I), (P), (C), (GC), (wImA), and
(ImA) for all A ∈ F . Moreover, N1 ∈ F implies (sP), and B1 ∈ F implies (sP’).
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Depending on whether (sP) or (sP’) is required, a look at Figure 1 shows that one
may for example choose one of the chains
F = {Dβ, . . . , Dγ , N
S
δ , . . . , N
S
ε , Nζ , . . . , Nη, N1,M1}
with 0 < β 6 γ 6 δ 6 ε 6 ζ 6 η 6 1,
F = {Dβ, . . . , Dγ , Rδ, . . . , Rε, Pζ , . . . , Pη, E 1
2
,
Uϑ, . . . , Uκ, Bλ, . . . , Bµ,M
S
ν , . . . ,M
S
ξ ,Mπ, . . . ,M̺,M1}
with 0 < β 6 · · · 6 η 6 12 6 ϑ 6 · · · 6 ̺, or
F = {Dβ, . . . , Dγ , Eδ, . . . , Eε, Pζ , . . . , Pη,
Rϑ, . . . , Rκ, Bλ, . . . , Bµ,M
S
ν , . . . ,M
S
ξ ,Mπ, . . . ,M̺,M1}
with 0 < β 6 n2n−1 < γ 6 · · · 6 ̺.
Furthermore, it was argued that considerations about possible power of minori-
ties and the need to “protect” minorities against majorities may help deciding what
types of relations and what range of strengths actually to use, where the types B
and D seem to have the greatest appeal.
Many things remain to be done: First of all, I did not check whether the (C)-
and (GC)-modifications also preserve (sNNR). Secondly, what about strategic vot-
ing? And, what seems to be most important to me, there should be some “experi-
mental” investigations by means of stochastic simulations which would randomly
generate profiles of preferences of different type: either arbitrary, or complete
and/or acyclic and/or transitive and/or antisymmetric. By their means it should
be possible to distinguish between the rules where the axiomatic approach alone
does not provide a satisfactory evaluation.
In fact, first “on-the-fly”-simulations seem to suggest that, depending on the
degrees of antisymmetry and completeness in the individual preferences and on
the relative sizes of S and N , either the combination of strict types like B and
P or the combination of non-strict types like D and R has a very large proba-
bility of giving a “deterministic” choice C(S) with |C(S)| = 1. Particularly, for
A ∈ {R,P,E,D} and n → ∞, the probability that |{Aα : 12 < α 6 1}| =
(
|S|
2
)
tends to one, and in this case the rules A(.5,1] must choose deterministically: Oth-
erwise, assuming x, y ∈ C(S), x 6= y, and, without loss of generality, xA.5+ε y
because of (ii), one would conclude that also y trS(A.5+ε)x. Then (ii) implies that
there is some α for which only one of x trS(Aα) y and y trS(Aα)x is true — a
contradiction. That is, quite contrary to the simple majority rule, these rules lead
to deterministic choices with a probability that tends to one for large n. This might
also indicate that type D surpasses B here.
In case of large S, on the other hand, it is, unfortunately, a nontrivial task to
generate a uniformly distributed random sample of acyclic or transitive relations
on S (see, for example, [?], and [?] for the case of order relations). For a simula-
tion, one would therefore first have to search for a probability distribution on the
possible preference relations that models actual distributions sufficiently well and
at the same time allows for a quick generation of samples.
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Finally, how can an actual implementation of these rules look like? While for
only three or four alternatives, a group can perform the necessary steps by hand,
this becomes quickly unworkable with more alternatives. That is, it might be quite
difficult to design a procedural, intuitive, plausible, and manageable algorithm in
the sense of Haake, Raith, and Su [?,?] (see also [?]). Probably the application of
any sophisticated choice rule that allows for other individual preference relations
than only total (quasi-)orders will have to involve a human or artificial moderator
who first determines the individual preferences either by pairwise ballots or by
interviewing each individual separately, then performs the computation of C(S),
and finally explains and defends this suggested result. This motivates the search
for an interviewing technique that can determine an arbitrary individual preference
relation on S in a considerably smaller expected time than
(
|S|
2
)
, the time required
for the pairwise ballots.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5. Mainly, we have to verify that C′ := C(CC) is indeed well-
defined, i.e., that the definition is not circular and does not depend on the choice
of B. We can do this by induction on the size of S: Let R and S be given.
For |S| = 1, no component is properly contained in S, and the five conditions
in 2. hold, because here C′(S) = S, independently of any profile. Now as-
sume that well-definedness of C′(S˜; R˜) and the five conditions have already been
proved for all R˜ and all |S˜| < |S|. Let B1, B2 ⊂ S be components of R. Then
|B1|, |B2|, |S/B1|, |S/B2| < |S|, so that the definition is not circular, and, without
loss of generality, we have one of the following five situations:
(i) B1 ∩ B2 = ∅: Then B1 and B2 are also components of R/B2 and R/B1,
respectively, the profile R21 := (R/B2)/B1 on S21 := (S/B2)/B1 is isomorphic
to the profile R12 := (R/B1)/B2 on S12 := (S/B1)/B2, R/B1|B2 ∼= R|B2 ,
and R/B2|B1 ∼= R|B1 . Therefore, by induction, C′(S;R) \ (B1 ∪ B2) =
C′(S21;R21) = C
′(S12;R12). Moreover, when B1 is used in the recursion, ei-
ther
C′(S;R) ∩B1 = C
′(B1;R)
or it is empty, the former if B1 ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1). If, on the other hand, B2 is
used, either
C′(S;R) ∩B1 = C
′(S/B2;R/B2) ∩B1 = C
′(B1;R/B2)
or it is empty, the former if B1 ∈ C′(S21;R21). But, by induction,
B1 ∈ C
′(S/B1;R/B1)⇐⇒ B1 ∈ C
′(S12;R12)⇐⇒ B1 ∈ C
′(S21;R21),
and C′(B1;R) = C′(B1;R/B2). The case of C′(S;R) ∩ B2 is analogous. This
shows thatC′(S;R) does not depend on whetherB1 orB2 is used in the recursion.
(ii) B1 ⊆ B2: Then B1 is a component of R|B2 , B2/B1 is a component of
R/B1, and R/B2 ∼= (R/B1)/(B2/B1). Again,
C′(S;R) \B2 = C
′(S/B2;R/B2) = C
′(S12;R12).
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Now, when directly using B2,
C′(S;R) ∩B1 = C
′(B2;R) ∩B1 = C
′(B1;R)
if B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2) and B1 ∈ C′(B2/B1;R/B1). On the other hand, when
first B1 is used,
C′(S;R) ∩B1 = C
′(B1;R)
if B1 ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1). But B1 ∈ B2/B1 which is a component of R/B1,
hence B1 ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1) is equivalent to B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2) and B1 ∈
C′(B2/B1;R/B1).
Moreover, when we directly use B2,
C′(S;R) ∩ (B2 \B1) = C
′(B2;R) \B1 = C
′(B2/B1;R/B1) \ {B1}
if B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2). When B1 is used instead,
C′(S;R) ∩ (B2 \B1) = C
′(S/B1;R/B1) ∩ (B2 \ {B1})
= C′(B2/B1;R/B1) \ {B1}
if B2/B1 ∈ C′((S/B1)/(B2/B1); (R/B1)/(B2/B1)). Again, this last condition
is equivalent to B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2), because there is a canonical isomorphism
between (R/B1)/(B2/B1) and R/B2 that maps B2/B1 to B2.
(iii) |B1 ∩B2| > 2: Then also B3 := B1 ∩B2 is a component of R, so that we
can apply (ii) two times because of B3 ⊆ B1 and B3 ⊆ B2.
(iv) |B1 \ B2|, |B2 \ B1| > 2: The reader may easily verify that then also
B′1 := B1 \ B2 and B′2 := B2 \ B1 are components of R, so that we may first
apply (ii) on B1 and B′1, then (i) on B′1 and B′2, and finally (ii) on B′2 and B2.
(v) |B1| = 2, |B1 ∩ B2| = 1, say B1 = {x, y} and x ∈ B2: As for x: Using
B2,
x ∈ C′(S;R)⇐⇒ x ∈ C′(B2;R) and B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2),
while using B1,
x ∈ C′(S;R)⇐⇒ x ∈ C′(B1;R) and B1 ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1).
But (I) and (Iso) show that both conditions are equivalent, because the canonical
isomorphism between R|B2 and R/B1|S/B1 maps x to B1, and the one between
R|B1 and R/B2|S/B2 maps x to B2.
As for y: When we use B2,
y ∈ C′(S;R)⇐⇒ y ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2).
When B1 is used instead,
y ∈ C′(S;R)⇐⇒ y ∈ C′(B1;R) and B1 ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1).
Again, both conditions are equivalent: First, R/B2|S/B2 ∼= R|B1 , so that (I) and
(Iso) imply the equivalence of y ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2) and y ∈ C′(B1;R). More-
over, because B2 and B1 are components, the latter implies that, for all z ∈ B2,
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y ∈ C′({y, z};R) and therefore x ∈ C′({x, z};R). Now (GC) shows that then
also x ∈ C′(B2;R), i.e. B1 ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1).
As for z ∈ B2 \ {x}: Using B2,
z ∈ C′(S;R)⇐⇒ z ∈ C′(B2;R) and B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2),
while if we use B1,
z ∈ C′(S;R)⇐⇒ z ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1).
As above, R/B1|S/B1 ∼= R|B2 , so that (I) and (Iso) imply the equivalence of
z ∈ C′(S/B1;R/B1) and z ∈ C′(B2;R). Moreover, the latter implies that
C′(B2;R) 6= {x}, so that, by (C), there must be some w ∈ B2 \ {x} such that
w ∈ C′({x,w};R). Since B1 and B2 are components, w ∈ C′({y, w};R) and
thus x ∈ C′({y, x};R), so that finally B2 ∈ C′(S/B2;R/B2).
Now a straightforward proof shows that (C) and (GC) also hold for S and R,
while (Iso) and (I) are obvious, and (CC) holds by definition. 
